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Abstract
Motivated by the fact that in many game-theoretic settings, the game analyzed is only an approxi-
mation to the game being played, in this work we analyze equilibrium computation for the broad and
natural class of bimatrix games that are stable to perturbations. We specifically focus on games with the
property that small changes in the payoff matrices do not cause the Nash equilibria of the game to fluctu-
ate wildly. For such games we show how one can compute approximate Nash equilibria more efficiently
than the general result of Lipton et al. [18], by an amount that depends on the degree of stability of the
game and that reduces to their bound in the worst case. Furthermore, we show that for stable games
the approximate equilibria found will be close in variation distance to true equilibria, and moreover this
holds even if we are given as input only a perturbation of the actual underlying stable game.
For uniformly-stable games, where the equilibria fluctuate at most quasi-linearly in the extent of the
perturbation, we get a particularly dramatic improvement. Here, we achieve a fully quasi-polynomial-
time approximation scheme: that is, we can find 1/poly(n)-approximate equilibria in quasi-polynomial
time. This is in marked contrast to the general class of bimatrix games for which finding such approx-
imate equilibria is PPAD-hard. In particular, under the (widely believed) assumption that PPAD is not
contained in quasi-polynomial time, our results imply that such uniformly stable games are inherently
easier for computation of approximate equilibria than general bimatrix games.
1 Introduction
The Nash equilibrium solution concept has a long history in economics and game theory as a description for
the natural result of self-interested behavior [20, 22]. Its importance has led to significant effort in the com-
puter science literature in recent years towards understanding their computational structure, and in particular
on the complexity of finding both Nash and approximate Nash equilibria. A series of results culminating
in the work by Daskalakis, Goldberg, and Papadimitriou [10] and Chen, Deng, and Teng [7, 8] showed
that finding a Nash equilibrium or even a 1/poly(n)-approximate equilibrium, is PPAD-complete even for
2-player bimatrix games. For general values of ǫ, the best known algorithm for finding ǫ-approximate
equilibria runs in time nO((logn)/ǫ2), based on a structural result of Lipton et al. [18] showing that there
always exist ǫ-approximate equilibria with support over at most O((log n)/ǫ2) strategies. This structural
result has been shown to be existentially tight [15]. Even for large values of ǫ, despite considerable ef-
fort [11, 12, 21, 15, 6, 17], polynomial-time algorithms for computing ǫ-approximate equilibria are known
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only for ǫ ≥ 0.3393 [21]. These results suggest a difficult computational landscape for equilibrium and
approximate equilibrium computation on worst-case instances.
In this paper we go beyond worst-case analysis and investigate the equilibrium computation problem in a
natural class of bimatrix games that are stable to perturbations. As we argue, on one hand, such games can be
used to model many realistic situations. On the other hand, we show that they have additional structure which
can be exploited to provide better algorithmic guarantees than what is believed to be possible on worst-case
instances. The starting point of our work is the realization that games are typically only abstractions of
reality and except in the most controlled settings, payoffs listed in a game that represents an interaction
between self-interested agents are only approximations to the agents’ exact utilities. 1 As a result, for
problems such as equilibrium computation, it is natural to focus attention to games that are robust to the
exact payoff values, in the sense that small changes to the entries in the game matrices do not cause the
Nash equilibria to fluctuate wildly; otherwise, even if equilibria can be computed, they may not actually be
meaningful for understanding behavior in the game that is played. In this work, we focus on such games
and analyze their structural properties as well as their implications to the equilibrium computation problem.
We show how their structure can be leveraged to obtain better algorithms for computing approximate Nash
equilibria, as well as strategies close to true Nash equilibria. Furthermore, we provide such algorithmic
guarantees even if we are given only a perturbation of the actual stable game being played.
To formalize such settings we consider bimatrix games G that satisfy what we call the (ǫ,∆) perturbation
stability condition, meaning that for any game G′ within L∞ distance ǫ of G (each entry changed by at most
ǫ), each Nash equilibrium (p′, q′) in G′ is ∆-close to some Nash equilibrium (p, q) in G, where closeness is
given by variation distance. Clearly, any game is (ǫ, 1) perturbation stable for any ǫ and the smaller the ∆
the more structure the (ǫ,∆) perturbation stable games have. In this paper we study the meaningful range
of parameters, several structural properties, and the algorithmic behavior of these games.
Our first main result shows that for an interesting and general range of parameters the structure of perturba-
tion stable games can be leveraged to obtain better algorithms for equilibrium computation. Specifically, we
show that all n-action (ǫ,∆) perturbation-stable games with at most nO((∆/ǫ)2) Nash equilibria must have a
well-supported ǫ-equilibrium of support O(∆
2 log(1+∆−1)
ǫ2
log n). This yields an nO(
∆2 log(1+∆−1)
ǫ2
logn)
-time
algorithm for finding an ǫ-equilibrium, improving by a factor O(1/∆2 log(1 + ∆−1)) in the exponent over
the bound of [18] for games satisfying this condition (and reducing to the bound of [18] in the worst-case
when ∆ = 1).2 Moreover, the stability condition can be further used to show that the approximate equilib-
rium found will be ∆-close to a true equilibrium, and this holds even if the algorithm is given as input only
a perturbation to the true underlying stable game.
A particularly interesting class of games for which our results provide a dramatic improvement are those that
satisfy what we call t-uniform stability to perturbations. These are games that for some ǫ0 = 1/poly(n) and
some t satisfy the (ǫ, tǫ) stability to perturbations condition for all ǫ < ǫ0. For games satisfying t-uniform
stability to perturbations with t = poly(log(n)), our results imply that we can find 1/poly(n)-approximate
equilibria in npoly(log(n)) time, i.e., achieve a fully quasi-polynomial-time approximation scheme (FQP-
TAS). This is especially interesting because the results of [8] prove that it is PPAD-hard to find 1/poly(n)-
approximate equlibria in general games. Our results shows that under the (widely believed) assumption that
PPAD is not contained in quasi-polynomial time [9], such uniformly stable game are inherently easier for
1For example, if agents are two corporations with various possible actions in some proposed market, the precise payoffs to the
corporations may depend on specific quantities such as demand for electricity or the price of oil, which cannot be fully known in
advance but only estimated.
2One should think of ∆ as a function of ǫ, with both possibly depending on n. E.g., ǫ = 1/
√
n and ∆ = 6ǫ.
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computation of approximate equilibria than general bimatrix games.3 Moreover, variants of many games
appearing commonly in experimental economics including the public goods game, matching pennies, and
identical interest game [14] satisfy this condition. See Sections 3, 5, and Appendix C for detailed examples.
Our second main result shows that computing an ǫ-equilibrium in a game satisfying the (ǫ,Θ(ǫ1/4)) per-
turbation stability condition is as hard as computing a Θ(ǫ1/4)-equilibrium in a general game. For our
reduction, we show that any general game can be embedded into one having the (ǫ,Θ(ǫ1/4)) perturbation
stability property such that an ǫ equilibrium in the new game yields a Θ(ǫ1/4)-equilibrium in the original
game. This result implies that the interesting range for the (ǫ,∆)-perturbation stability condition, where one
could hope to do significantly better than in the general case, is ∆ = o(ǫ1/4).
We also connect our stability to perturbations condition to a seemingly very different stability to approxima-
tions condition introduced by Awasthi et al. [2]. Formally, a game satisfies the strong (ǫ,∆)-approximation
stability condition if all ǫ-approximate equilibria are contained inside a small ball of radius ∆ around a
single equilibrium.4 We prove that our stability to perturbations condition is equivalent to a much weaker
version of this condition that we call the well-supported approximation stability. This condition requires
only that for any well-supported ǫ-approximate equilibrium 5 (p, q) there exists a Nash equilibrium (p∗, q∗)
that is ∆-close to (p, q). Clearly, the well supported approximation stability condition is more general than
strong (ǫ,∆)-approximation stability considered by [2] since rather than assuming that there exists a fixed
Nash equilibrium (p∗, q∗) such that all ǫ-approximate equilibria are contained in a ball of radius ∆ around
(p∗, q∗), it requires only that for any well-supported ǫ-approximate equilibrium (p, q) there exists a Nash
equilibrium (p∗, q∗) that is ∆-close to (p, q). Thus, perturbation-stable games are significantly more expres-
sive than strongly approximation stable games and Section 3 presents several examples of games satisfying
the former but not the latter. However, our lower bound (showing that the interesting range of parameters is
∆ = O(ǫ1/4)) also holds for the strong stability to approximations condition.
We also provide an interesting structural result showing that each Nash equilibrium of an (ǫ,∆) perturbation
stable game with nO((∆/ǫ)2) Nash equilibria must be 8∆-close to well-supported ǫ-approximate equilibrium
of support only O(∆
2 log(1+∆−1)
ǫ2
log n). Similarly, a t-uniformly stable game with nO(t2) equilibria has the
property that for any ∆, each equilibrium is 8∆-close to a well-supported ∆/t-approximate equilibrium
with support of size O(t2 log(1 + ∆−1) log n). This property implies that in quasi-polynomial time we can
in fact find a set of approximate-Nash equilibria that cover (within distance 8∆) the set of all Nash equilibria
in such games.
It is interesting to note that for our algorithmic results for finding approximate equilibria we do not require
knowing the stability parameters. If the game happens to be reasonably stable, then we get improved running
times over the Lipton et al. [18] guarantees; if this is not the case, then we fall back to the Lipton et al. [18]
guarantees.6 However, given a game, it might be interesting to know how stable it is. In this direction, we
provide a characterization of stable constant-sum games in Section 6 and an algorithm for computing the
3The generic result of [18] achieves quasi-polynomial time only for ǫ = Ω(1/poly(log n)).
4 [2] argue that this condition is interesting since in situations where one would want to use an approximate Nash equilibrium
for predicting how players will play (which is a common motivation for computing a Nash or an approximate Nash equilibrium),
without such a condition the approximate equilibrium found might be far from the equilibrium played.
5Recall that in an ǫ-Nash equilibrium, the expected payoff of each player is within ǫ from her best response payoff; however
the mixed strategies may include poorly-performing pure strategies in their support. By contrast, the support of a well-supported
ǫ-approximate equilibrium may only contain strategies whose payoffs fall within ǫ of the player’s best-response payoff.
6This is because algorithmically, we can simply try different support sizes in increasing order and stop when we find strategies
forming a (well-supported) ǫ-equilibrium. In other words, given ǫ, the desired approximation level, we can find an ǫ-approximate
equilibrium in time nO(
∆2 log(1+∆−1)
ǫ
2 logn) where ∆ is the smallest value such that the game is (ǫ,∆) perturbation stable.
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strong stability parameters of a given constant-sum game.
1.1 Related Work
In addition to results on computing (approximate) equilibria in worst-case instances of general bimatrix
games, there has also been a series of results on polynomial-time algorithms for computing (approximate)
equilibria in specific classes of bimatrix games. For example, Ba´ra´ny et al. [4] considered two-player games
with randomly chosen payoff matrices, and showed that with high probability, such games have Nash equi-
libria with small support. Their result implies that in random two-player games, Nash equilibria can be
computed in expected polynomial time. Kannan and Theobald [16] provide an FPTAS for the case where
the sum of the two payoff matrices has constant rank and Adsul et al. [1] provide a polynomial time algo-
rithm for computing an exact Nash equilibrium of a rank-1 bimatrix game.
Awasthi et al. [2] analyzed the question of finding an approximate Nash in equilibrium in games that sat-
isfy stability with respect to approximation. However, their condition is quite restrictive in that it focuses
only on games that have the property that all the Nash equilibria are close together, thus eliminating from
consideration most common games. By contrast, our perturbation stability notion, which (as mentioned
above) can be shown to be a generalization of their notion, captures many more realistic situations. Our
upper bounds on approximate equilibria can be viewed as generalizing the corresponding result of [2] and it
is significantly more challenging technically. Moreover, our lower bounds also apply to the stability notion
of [2] and provide the first (nontrivial) results about the interesting range of parameters for that stability
notion as well.
In a very different context, for clustering problems, Bilu and Linial [5] analyze maxcut clustering instances
with the property that if the distances are perturbed by a multiplicative factor of α, then the optimum does not
change; they show that under this condition, for α =
√
n, one can find the optimum solution in polynomial
time. Recently, Awasthi et al. [3], have shown a similar result for the k-median clustering problem and
showed a similar result for α =
√
3. Our stability to perturbations notion is inspired by this work, but is
substantially less restrictive in two respects. First, we require stability only to small perturbations in the
input, and second, we do not require the solutions (Nash equilibria) to stay fixed under perturbation, but
rather just ask that they have a bounded degree of movement.
The notion of stability to perturbations we consider in our paper is also related to the stability notions consid-
ered by Lipton et al. [19] for economic solution concepts. The main focus of their work was understanding
whether for a given solution concept or optimization problem all instances are stable. In this paper, our main
focus is on understanding how rich the class of stable instances is, and what properties one can determine
about their structure that can be leveraged to get better algorithms for computing approximate Nash equi-
libria.7 We provide the first results showing better algorithms for computing approximate equilibria in such
games.
2 Preliminaries
We consider 2-player general-sum n-action bimatrix games. Let R denote the payoff matrix to the row
player and C denote the payoff matrix of the column player. If the row player chooses strategy i and the
7Just as in [19], one can show that for the stability conditions we consider in our paper, there exist unstable instances.
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column player chooses strategy j, the payoffs are Ri,j and Ci,j respectively. We assume all payoffs are
scaled to the range [0, 1].
A mixed strategy for a player is a probability distribution over the set of his pure strategies. The ith pure
strategy will be represented by the unit vector ei, that has 1 in the ith coordinate and 0 elsewhere. For a
mixed strategy pair (p, q), the payoff to the row player is the expected value of a random variable which is
equal to Ri,j with probability piqj . Therefore the payoff to the row player is pTRq. Similarly the payoff to
the column player is pTCq. Given strategies p and q for the row and column player, we denote by supp(p)
and supp(q) the support of p and q, respectively.
A Nash equilibrium [20] is a pair of strategies (p∗, q∗) such that no player has an incentive to deviate
unilaterally. Since mixed strategies are convex combinations of pure strategies, it suffices to consider only
deviations to pure strategies. In particular, a pair of mixed strategies (p∗, q∗) is a Nash-equilibrium if for
every pure strategy i of the row player we have eTi Rq∗ ≤ p∗TRq∗, and for every pure strategy j of the
column player we have p∗TCej ≤ p∗TCq∗. Note that in a Nash equilibrium (p∗, q∗), all rows i in the support
of p∗ satisfy eTi Rq∗ = p∗
TRq∗ and similarly all columns j in the support of q∗ satisfy p∗TCej = p∗TCq∗.
Definition 1 A pair of mixed strategies (p, q) is an ǫ-equilibrium if both players have no more than ǫ incen-
tive to deviate. Formally, (p, q) is an ǫ-equilibrium if for all rows i, we have eTi Rq ≤ pTRq + ǫ, and for all
columns j, we have pTCej ≤ pTCq + ǫ.
Definition 2 A pair of mixed strategies (p, q) is a well supported ǫ-equilibrium if for any i ∈ supp(p) (i.e.,
i s. t. pi > 0) we have eTi Rq ≥ eTj Rq − ǫ, for all j; similarly, for any i ∈ supp(q) (i.e., i s. t. qi > 0) we
have pTCei ≥ pTCej − ǫ, for all j.
Definition 3 We say that a bimatrix game G′ specified by R′, C ′ is an L∞ α-perturbation of G specified by
R,C if we have |Ri,j −R′i,j| ≤ α and |Ci,j − C ′i,j| ≤ α for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Definition 4 For two probability distributions q and q′, we define the distance between q and q′ as the
variation distance:
d(q, q′) =
1
2
∑
i
|qi − q′i| =
∑
i
max(qi − q′i, 0) =
∑
i
max(q′i − qi, 0).
We define the distance between two strategy pairs as the maximum of the row-player’s and column-player’s
distances, that is: d((p, q), (p′, q′)) = max[d(p, p′), d(q, q′)].
It is easy to see that d is a metric. If d((p, q), (p′, q′)) ≤ ∆, then we say that (p′, q′) is ∆-close to (p, q).
Throughout this paper we use “log” to mean log-base-e.
3 Stable Games
The main notion of stability we introduce and study in this paper requires that any Nash equilibrium in a per-
turbed game be close to a Nash equilibrium in the original game. This is an especially motivated condition
since in many real world situations the entries of the game we analyze are merely based on measurements
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and thus only approximately reflect the players’ payoffs. In order to be useful for prediction, we would like
that equilibria in the game we operate with be close to equilibria in the real game played by the players.
Otherwise, in games where certain equilibria of slightly perturbed games are far from all equilibria in the
original game, the analysis of behavior (or prediction) will be meaningless. Formally:
Definition 5 A game G satisfies the (ǫ,∆) stability to perturbations condition if for any G′ that is an L∞
ǫ-perturbation of G and for any Nash equilibrium (p, q) in G′, there exists a Nash equilibrium (p∗, q∗) in G
such that (p, q) is ∆-close to (p∗, q∗). 8
Observe that fixing ǫ, a smaller ∆ means a stronger condition and a larger ∆ means a weaker condition.
Every game is (ǫ, 1)-perturbation stable, and as ∆ gets smaller, we might expect for the game to exhibit
more useful structure.
Another stability condition we consider in this work is stability to approximations:
Definition 6 A game satisfies the (ǫ,∆)-approximation stability condition if for any ǫ-equilibrium (p, q)
there exists a Nash equilibrium (p∗, q∗) such that (p, q) is ∆-close to (p∗, q∗).
A game satisfies the well supported (ǫ,∆)-approximation stability condition if for any well supported ǫ-
equilibrium (p, q) there exists a Nash equilibrium (p∗, q∗) such that (p, q) is ∆-close to (p∗, q∗).
Clearly, if a game satisfies the (ǫ,∆)-approximation stability condition, then it also satisfies the well sup-
ported (ǫ,∆)-approximation stability condition. Interestingly, we show that the stability to perturbations
condition is equivalent to the well supported approximation stability condition. Specifically:
Theorem 1 A game satisfies the well supported (2ǫ,∆)-approximation stability condition if and only if it
satisfies the (ǫ,∆)-stability to perturbations condition.
Proof: Consider an n × n bimatrix game specified by R and C and assume it satisfies the well supported
(2ǫ,∆)-approximation stability condition; we show it also satisfies the (ǫ,∆)-stability to perturbations con-
dition. Consider R′ = R + Γ and C ′ = C + Λ, where |Γi,j| ≤ ǫ and |Λi,j| ≤ ǫ, for all i, j. Let (p, q)
be an arbitrary Nash equilibrium in the new game specified by R′ and C ′. We will show that (p, q) is a
well supported 2ǫ-approximate Nash equilibrium in the original game specified by R and C . To see this,
note that by definition, (since (p, q) is a Nash equilibrium in the game specified by R′ and C ′) we have
eTj R
′q ≤ pTR′q ≡ vR for all j; therefore eTj Rq + eTj Γq ≤ vR, so eTj Rq ≤ vR + ǫ, for all j. On the other
hand we also have eTi Rq = eTi R′q − eTi Γq ≥ vR − ǫ for all i ∈ supp(p). Therefore, eTi Rq ≥ eTj Rq − 2ǫ,
for all i ∈ supp(p) and for all j. Similarly we can show pTCei ≥ pTCej − 2ǫ, for all i ∈ supp(q) and
for all j. This implies that (p, q) is well supported 2ǫ-approximate Nash in the original game, and so by
assumption is ∆-close to a Nash equilibrium of the game specified by R and C . So, this game satisfies the
(ǫ,∆)-stability to perturbations condition.
In the reverse direction, consider an n × n bimatrix game specified by R and C and assume it satisfies the
(ǫ,∆)-stability to perturbations condition. Let (p, q) be an arbitrary well supported 2ǫ Nash equilibrium
8Note that the entries of the perturbed game are not restricted to the [0, 1] interval, and are allowed to belong to [−ǫ, 1 + ǫ].
This is a proper way to formulate the notion because it implies, for instance, that if G is (ǫ,∆) stable to perturbations, then for any
α > 0, αG is (αǫ,∆) stable to perturbations. Theorem 1 provides further evidence that this definition is proper.
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in this game. Let us define matrices R′ and C ′ such that eTi R′q = maxi′ ei′TRq − ǫ for all i ∈ supp(p)
and eTi R′q ≤ maxi′ eTi′Rq − ǫ for all i /∈ supp(p), pTC ′ej = maxj′ pTCej′ − ǫ for all j ∈ supp(q) and
pTC ′ej′ ≤ maxj pTCej′ − ǫ for all j /∈ supp(q). Since (p, q) is a well supported 2ǫ Nash equilibrium we
know this can be done such that |(R′ − R)i,j| ≤ ǫ and |(C ′ − C)i,j| ≤ ǫ, for all i, j (in particular, we have
to add quantities in [−ǫ, ǫ] to all the elements in rows i of R in the support of p and subtract quantities in
[0, ǫ] from all the elements in rows i of R not in the support of p; similarly for q). By design, (p, q) is a
Nash equilibrium in the game defined by R′, C ′, and from the (ǫ,∆)-stability to perturbations condition,
we obtain that it is ∆-close to a true Nash equilibrium of the game specified by R and C . Thus, any well
supported 2ǫ Nash equilibrium in the game specified by R and C is ∆-close to a true Nash equilibrium of
this game, as desired.
One can show that the well supported approximation stability is a strict relaxation of the approximation
stability condition. For example, consider the 2× 2 bimatrix game
R =
[
1 1
1− ǫ0 1− ǫ0
]
C =
[
1 1− ǫ0
1 1− ǫ0
]
For ǫ < ǫ0 this game satisfies the well supported (ǫ, 0)-approximation stability condition, but does not
satisfy (ǫ,∆)-approximation stability for any ∆ < ǫ/ǫ0. To see this note that eT1 Rq = 1, eT2Rq = 1 − ǫ0,
pTCe1 = 1, and pTCe2 = 1 − ǫ0 for any p and q. This implies that the only well supported ǫ-Nash
equilibrium is identical to the Nash equilibrium (1, 0)T , (1, 0)T , thus the game is well supported (ǫ, 0)-
approximation stable. On the other hand, the pair of mixed strategies (p, q) with p = (1− ǫ/ǫ0, ǫ/ǫ0)T and
q = (1 − ǫ/ǫ0, ǫ/ǫ0)T is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium. The distance between (p, q) and the unique Nash is ǫ/ǫ0,
thus this game is not (ǫ,∆)-approximation stable for any ∆ < ǫ/ǫ0.
Interestingly, the notion of approximation stability which is a restriction of the well-supported approximation
stability and of stability to perturbations conditions is a relaxation of the stability condition considered by
Awasthi et al. [2] which requires that all approximate equilibria be contained in a ball of radius ∆ around
a single Nash equilibrium. In this direction, we define the strong version of stability conditions given in
Definitions 3 and 4 to be a reversal of quantifiers that asks there be a single (p∗, q∗) such that each relevant
(p, q) (equilibrium in an ǫ-perturbed game, ǫ-approximate equilibrium, or well-supported ǫ-approximate
equilibrium) is ∆-close to (p∗, q∗). Formally:
Definition 7 A game G satisfies the strong (ǫ,∆) stability to perturbations condition if there exists (p∗, q∗)
a Nash equilibrium of G such that for any G′ that is an L∞ ǫ-perturbation of G we have that any Nash
equilibrium in G′ is ∆-close to (p∗, q∗).
A game G satisfies the strong (well supported) (ǫ,∆)-approximation stability condition if there exists
(p∗, q∗) a Nash equilibrium of G such that any (well supported) ǫ-equilibrium (p, q) is ∆-close to (p∗, q∗).
It is immediate from its proof that Theorem 1 applies to the strong versions of the definitions as well. We
also note that our generic upper bounds in Section 4 will apply to the most relaxed version (perturbation-
stability) and our generic lower bound in Section 5 will be apply to the most stringent version (strong approx
stability).
Range of parameters As shown in [2], if a game G satisfies the strong (ǫ,∆)-approximation stability
condition and has a non-trivial Nash equilibrium (an equilibrium in which the players do not both have
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full support), then we must have ∆ ≥ ǫ. We can show that if a game G satisfies the (ǫ,∆)-approximation
stability and if the union of all ∆-balls around all Nash equilibria does not cover the whole space,9 then we
must have 3∆ ≥ ǫ – see Lemma 5 in Appendix B. In Section 5 we further discuss the meaningful range of
parameters from the point of view of the equilibrium computation problem.
Examples Variants of many classic games including the public goods game, matching pennies, and iden-
tical interest games are stable. As an example, consider the following modified identical interest game. Both
players have n available actions. The first action is to stay home, and the other actions correspond to n− 1
different possible meeting locations. If a player chooses action 1 (stay home), his payoff is 1/2 no matter
what the other player is doing. If the player chooses to go out to a meeting location, his payoff is 1 if the
other player is there as well and it is 0 otherwise. This game has n pure equilibria (all (ei, ei)) and
(n
2
)
equilibria (all (1/2ei + 1/2ej , 1/2ei + 1/2ej)) and it is well-supported (ǫ, 2ǫ)-approximation stable for all
ǫ < 1/6. Note that it does not satisfy strong (well-supported) stability because it has multiple very distinct
equilibria. For further examples see Lemma 2 in Section 5, as well as Appendix C.
4 Equilibria in Stable Games
In this section we show we can leverage the structure implied by stability to perturbations to improve over
the best known generic bound of [18]. We start by considering ǫ and ∆ as given. We can show:
Theorem 2 Let us fix ǫ and ∆, 0 ≤ ǫ ≤ ∆ ≤ 1. Consider a game with at most nO((∆/ǫ)2) Nash equilib-
ria which satisfies the well supported (ǫ,∆)-approximation stability condition (or the (ǫ/2,∆)-stability to
perturbations condition). Then there exists a well supported ǫ-equilibrium where each player’s strategy has
support O((∆/ǫ)2 log(1 + ∆−1) log n).
This improves by a factor O(1/(∆2 log(1 + ∆−1))) in the exponent over the bound of [18] for games
satisfying these conditions (and reduces to the bound of [18] in the worst-case when ∆ = 1).
Proof idea We start by showing that any Nash equilibrium (p∗, q∗) of G must be highly concentrated. In
particular, we show that for each of p∗, q∗, any portion of the distribution with substantial L1 norm (having
total probability at least 8∆) must also have high L2 norm: specifically the ratio of L2 norm to L1 norm
must be Ω((ǫ/∆)(log n)−1/2). This in turn can be used to show that each of p∗, q∗ has all but at most 8∆
of its total probability mass is concentrated in a set (which we call the high part) of size O((∆/ǫ)2 log(1 +
1/∆) log n). Once the desired concentration is proven, we can then perform a version of the [18] sampling
procedure on the low parts of p∗ and q∗ (with an accuracy of only ǫ/∆) to produce overall an ǫ-approximate
equilibrium of support only a constant factor larger. The primary challenge in this argument is to prove
that p∗ and q∗ are concentrated.10 This is done through our key lemma, Lemma 1 below. In particular,
Lemma 1 can be used to show that if p∗ (or q∗) had a portion with substantial L1 norm and low L2 norm,
then there must exist a deviation from p∗ (or q∗) that is far from all equilibria and yet is a well-supported
9If the union of all ∆-balls around all Nash equilibria does cover the whole space, this is an easy case from our perspective.
Any (p, q) would be a ǫ-equilibria.
10We note that [2] prove an upper bound for the strong approximation stability condition using the same concentration idea.
However, proving the desired concentration is significantly more challenging in our case since we deal with many equilibria.
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approximate-Nash equilibrium, violating the stability condition. Proving the existence of such a deviation
is challenging because of the large number of equilibria that may exist. Lemma 1 synthesizes the key points
of this argument and it is proven through a careful probabilistic argument.
In the following we consider c = (56)2 and let c′ = 27.
Lemma 1 Let us fix ǫ and ∆, 0 ≤ ǫ ≤ ∆ ≤ 1. Let p˜ be an arbitrary distribution over {1, 2, . . . , n}. Let
S = c(∆/ǫ)2 log n and fix β ≤ 1 such that 1−β ≥ 8∆. Assume that the entries of p˜ can be partitioned into
two sets H and L such that ‖p˜L‖1 = 1−β, ‖p˜H‖1 = β, ‖p˜L‖22 ≤ (1−β)
2
S . Let us fix k1 n-dimensional vectors
v1, . . . , vk1 with entries in [−1, 1] and k2 distributions p1, . . . , pk2 , where k1 = n2 and k2 ≤ nc
′(∆/ǫ)2
. Then
there exists p˜′ with supp(p˜′) ⊆ supp(p˜) such that:
1. d(p˜, p˜′) = 3∆ and
2. p˜′ · vi ≤ p˜ · vi + ǫ for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k1}.
3. d(p˜′, pi) > d(p˜, pi)−∆ for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k2}..
Proof: We show the desired result by using the probabilistic method. Let us define the random variable
Xi = 1 with probability 1/2 and Xi = 0 with probability 1/2. Define
p˜′i = p˜i, for i ∈ H and
p˜′i = p˜i +
3∆p˜iXi∑
i∈L p˜iXi
− 3∆p˜i(1−Xi)∑
i∈L p˜i(1−Xi)
, for i ∈ L.
We have E[
∑
i∈L p˜iXi] = (1 − β)/2. By applying McDiarmid’s inequality (see Theorem 6) and using the
fact that ‖p˜L‖22 ≤ (1−β)
2
S , we obtain that with probability at least 3/4 we have both:
|
∑
i∈L
p˜iXi − 1− β
2
| ≤ 1− β
12
and |
∑
i∈L
p˜i(1−Xi)− 1− β
2
| ≤ 1− β
12
. (1)
Assume that this happens. In this case, p˜′ is a legal mixed strategy for the row player and by construction
we have d(p˜, p˜′) = 3∆.
Let v be an arbitrary vector in {v1, . . . , vk1}. We have:
p˜′ · v = p˜ · v + 3∆
(∑
i∈L p˜iXivi∑
i∈L p˜iXi
−
∑
i∈L p˜i(1−Xi)vi∑
i∈L p˜i(1−Xi)
)
.
Define
Z1 =
∑
i∈L
p˜iXivi, Z2 =
∑
i∈L
p˜iXi, Z3 =
∑
i∈L
p˜i(1−Xi)vi, Z4 =
∑
i∈L
p˜i(1−Xi),
so we have:
p˜′ · v = p˜ · v + 3∆
(
Z1
Z2
− Z3
Z4
)
.
Using McDiarmid’s inequality we get that with probability at least 1−1/n3, each of the quantities Z1, Z2, Z3, Z4
is within (1−β28 )(
ǫ
∆) of its expectation; we are using here the fact that the value of Xi can change any one
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of the quantities by at most p˜i, so the exponent in the McDiarmid bound is −( ǫ∆)2(1−β28 )2/
∑
i∈L p˜
2
i ≤
−( c
282
) log n. Also, we have E[Z2] = E[Z4] = 1−β2 , and E[Z1] = E[Z3]. So, we get that with probability
at least 1− 1/n3 we have
p˜′ · v ≤ p˜ · v + 3∆
(
E[Z1] +
(1−β)ǫ
28∆
1−β
2 − (1−β)ǫ28∆
− E[Z3]−
(1−β)ǫ
28∆
1−β
2 +
(1−β)ǫ
28∆
)
= p˜ · v + 3∆
(
( 21−β )E[Z1] +
ǫ
14∆
1− ǫ14∆
−
( 21−β )E[Z3]− ǫ14∆
1 + ǫ14∆
)
= p˜ · v + 3∆
[(
2
1− βE[Z1] +
ǫ
14∆
)(
1 +
ǫ
14∆
)
−
(
2
1− βE[Z3]−
ǫ
14∆
)(
1− ǫ
14∆
)]( 1
1− ( ǫ14∆)2
)
≤ p˜ · v + 3.1∆
[(
2
1− βE[Z1] +
ǫ
14∆
)(
1 +
ǫ
14∆
)
−
(
2
1− βE[Z3]−
ǫ
14∆
)(
1− ǫ
14∆
)]
= p˜ · v + 3.1∆
(
2
1− β (E[Z1] +E[Z3])
( ǫ
14∆
)
+
ǫ
7∆
)
.
Finally, using the fact that Z1 + Z3 ≤
∑
i∈L p˜i = 1− β, we get
p˜′ · v ≤ p˜ · v + 3.1∆( ǫ
7∆
+
ǫ
7∆
),
yielding the desired bound p˜′ · v ≤ p˜ · v + ǫ. Applying the union bound over all i ∈ {1, . . . , k1} we obtain
that the probability that there exists v in v1, . . . , vk1 such that p˜′ · v ≥ p˜ · v + ǫ is at most 1/3.
Consider an arbitrary distribution p in {p1, . . . , pk2}. Assume that p = p˜+ g. By definition, we have:
d(p, p˜′) =
1
2
∑
i∈L
∣∣∣∣p˜i + gi − p˜i − 3∆p˜iXi∑
i∈L p˜iXi
+
3∆p˜i(1−Xi)∑n
i∈L p˜i(1−Xi)
∣∣∣∣+ 12
∑
i∈H
|gi|
=
1
2
∑
i∈L
∣∣∣∣gi − 3∆p˜iXi∑
i∈L p˜iXi
+
3∆p˜i(1−Xi)∑
i∈L p˜i(1−Xi)
∣∣∣∣+ 12
∑
i∈H
|gi|
≥ 1
2
∑
i∈L
∣∣∣∣gi − 6∆p˜iXi1− β + 6∆p˜i(1−Xi)1− β
∣∣∣∣− 12
∑
i∈L
[
6∆p˜iXi
5(1 − β) +
6∆p˜i(1−Xi)
7(1− β)
]
+
1
2
∑
i∈H
|gi|
≥ 1
2
∑
i∈L
∣∣∣∣gi − 6∆p˜iXi1− β + 6∆p˜i(1−Xi)1− β
∣∣∣∣− 12
∑
i∈L
6∆p˜i
5(1 − β) +
1
2
∑
i∈H
|gi|
=
1
2
∑
i∈L
∣∣∣∣gi − 6∆p˜iXi1− β + 6∆p˜i(1−Xi)1− β
∣∣∣∣− 3∆5 + 12
∑
i∈H
|gi|
where the first inequality follows from applying relation (1) to the denominators, and the last equality follows
from the fact that ‖p˜L‖1 = 1− β.
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Let us denote by Z = 12
∑
i∈L
∣∣∣gi − 6∆p˜iXi1−β + 6∆p˜i(1−Xi)1−β ∣∣∣. We have:
E[Z] =
1
2
∑
i∈L
[
1
2
∣∣∣∣gi − 6∆p˜i1− β
∣∣∣∣+ 12
∣∣∣∣gi + 6∆p˜i1− β
∣∣∣∣
]
≥ 1
2
∑
i∈L
|gi|,
therefore
E[d(p, p˜′)] ≥ E[Z] + 1
2
∑
i∈H
|gi| − 3∆
5
≥ 1
2
∑
i∈L
|gi|+ 1
2
∑
i∈H
|gi| − 3∆
5
= d(p, p˜)− 3∆
5
.
We can now apply McDiarmid’s inequality (see Theorem 6) to argue that with high probability Z is within
2∆/5 of its expectation. Note that ci = 6∆p˜i1−β . Therefore:
Pr {|Z −E[Z]| ≥ 2∆/5} ≤ 2e
−2∆2(1−β)2/(225
∑
i∈L
p˜2
i
∆2)
≤ 2e−(2/225)S ≤ 1
3k2
.
This then implies that
Pr
{
d(p, p˜′) ≤ d(p, p˜′)−∆} ≤ 1
3k2
.
By the union bound we get that the probability that there exists a p in {p1, . . . , pk2} such that d(p, p˜′) ≤
d(p, p˜′)−∆ is at most 1/3. Summing up overall all possible events we get that there is a non-zero probability
of (1), (2), (3) happening, as desired.
Proof (Theorem 2): Let (p∗, q∗) be an arbitrary Nash equilibrium. We show that each of p∗ and q∗ are
highly concentrated, meaning that all but at most 8∆ of their total probability mass is concentrated in a set
of size O((∆/ǫ)2 log(1 + 1/∆) log n). Let’s consider p∗ (the argument for q∗ is similar). We begin by
partitioning it into its heavy and light parts. Specifically, we greedily remove the largest entries of p∗ and
place them into a set H (the heavy elements) until either:
(a) the remaining entries L (the light elements) satisfy the condition that ∀i ∈ L, Pr[i] ≤ 1SPr[L] for S
as in Lemma 1, or
(b) Pr[H] ≥ 1− 8∆,
whichever comes first. Using the fact that the game satisfies the well supported (ǫ,∆)-approximation stabil-
ity condition, we will show that case (a) cannot occur first, which will imply that p∗ is highly concentrated.
In the following, we denote β as the total probability mass over H . Assume by contradiction that case (a)
occurs first. Note that we have ‖pL‖1 = 1− β, ‖pH‖1 = β, and
∑
i∈L
(pi)
2 ≤ 1
S
∑
i∈L
pi
∑
i∈L
pi =
1
S
(1− β)2,
so ‖pL‖22 ≤ (1−β)
2
S . Let vi,j = C(ei − ej). Since (p∗, q∗) is a Nash equilibrium we know that p∗ · vi,j ≤ 0
for all i and for all j ∈ supp(q∗).
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By Lemma 1 there exists p˜′ such that (1) d(p∗, p˜′) = 3∆, (2) p˜′ · vi,j ≤ p∗ · vi,j + ǫ for all i and for all
j ∈ supp(q∗) and (3) d(p˜′, pi) > d(p∗, pi)−∆ for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k} (here k is the number of equilibria of
the game). By (2) we have that p˜′ · vi,j ≤ ǫ for all i and for all j ∈ supp(q∗), which implies that (p˜′, q∗)
is a well supported ǫ approximate equilibrium (since by (2) the column player has at most an ǫ incentive to
deviate and since supp(p˜′) ⊆ supp(p∗) we know that the row player has no incentive to deviate). By (1)
we also have that (p˜′, q∗) is 3∆-far from (p∗, q∗). We now use (3) to show that (p˜′, q∗) is ∆-far from all
the other equilibria as well. Let p be such an equilibria. Note that if d(p, p∗) > 4∆, then clearly, by the
triangle inequality d(p, p˜′) > ∆. If d(p, p∗) < 2∆, clearly, by the triangle inequality, d(p, p˜′) > ∆. Finally
if d(p, p∗) ∈ [2∆, 4∆], then by (3), we that d(p, p˜′) > ∆, as desired.
Overall we get that (p˜′, q∗) is a well supported ǫ approximate equilibria that is ∆-far from all the other
equilibria of the game. This contradicts the well supported (ǫ,∆)-approximation stability condition, as
desired.
Thus case (b) occurs first, which implies that p∗ is highly concentrated. We clearly have 1 − β ≤ 8∆;
moreover, it is easy to show that the set H has at most S log (1 + (8∆)−1) elements. The key idea is that
since 1− β ≤ 8∆, we can now apply the sampling argument of [18] to L with accuracy parameter O(ǫ/∆)
and then union the result with H . Specifically, let us decompose p∗ as:
p∗ = βpH + (1− β)pL.
Applying the sampling argument of [18] to pL, we have that by sampling a multiset X of S elements from
L = supp(pL), we are guaranteed that for any column ej , we have:∣∣(UX )TCej − pTLCej∣∣ ≤ (ǫ/8∆),
where UX is the uniform distribution over X . This means that for p˜ = βpH + (1 − β)US , all columns ej
satisfy:
|p∗TCej − p˜TCej| ≤ ǫ/2.
We have thus found the row portion of an ǫ-equilibrium with support of size S log (1 + (8∆)−1) as desired.
Corollary 1 Let us fix ǫ and ∆, 0 ≤ ǫ ≤ ∆ ≤ 1. Let G be a game with at most nO((∆/ǫ)2) Nash equi-
libria satisfying the well supported (ǫ,∆)-approximation stability condition (or the (ǫ/2,∆)-stability to
perturbations condition).
(1) Given G we can find a well-supported ǫ-equilibrium (p, q) of G in time nO((∆/ǫ)2 log(1+∆−1) logn).
(2) Given G′, an L∞ ǫ/6-perturbation of G, we can find a well supported ǫ-equilibrium (p, q) of G in time
nO((∆/ǫ)
2 log(1+∆−1) logn)
.
In both cases, (p, q) is ∆-close to a Nash equilibrium (p∗, q∗) of G.
Proof: (1) By Theorem 2, we can simply try all supports of size nO((∆/ǫ)2 log(1+∆−1) logn) and for each of
them write an LP to search for a well-supported ǫ-Nash equilibrium.
(2) By Theorem 2, G has a well-supported ǫ/3-Nash equilibrium with support of size O((∆/ǫ)2 log(1 +
∆−1) log n). Since G′ is an L∞ ǫ/6-perturbation of G, then this is also a well-supported 2ǫ/3-Nash equilib-
rium of G′. Thus by trying all supports of size nO((∆/ǫ)2 log(1+∆−1) logn) in G′ we can find a well-supported
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2ǫ/3-Nash equilibrium of G′. Since G is an L∞ ǫ/6-perturbation of G′, this will be a well-supported ǫ-Nash
equilibrium of G.
Corollary 1 improves by a factor O(1/(∆2 log(1+∆−1))) in the exponent over the bound of [18] for games
satisfying this condition. The most interesting range of improvements happens when ǫ is a function on n
and ∆ is a function of ǫ; e.g., ǫ = 1/
√
n, ∆ = 10ǫ – in this case we obtain an improvement of O(n/ log(n))
in the exponent over the bound of [18].
The proof of Theorem 2 also implies an interesting structural result, namely that each Nash equilibrium of
such a game is close to a pair of strategies of small support and by the triangle inequality, the same will
happen for any perturbation of G. Formally:
Theorem 3 Let us fix ǫ and ∆, 0 ≤ ǫ ≤ ∆ ≤ 1. Consider a game G with at most nO((∆/ǫ)2) Nash equilib-
ria which satisfies the well supported (ǫ,∆)-approximation stability condition (or the (ǫ/2,∆)-stability to
perturbations condition). Then it must be the case that:
(1) Any Nash equilibrium in G is 8∆-close to a pair of mixed strategies each with support of size at most
O((∆/ǫ)2 log(1 + ∆−1) log n).
(2) For any game G′ with L∞ distance ǫ/2 of G, any Nash equilibrium in G′ is 9∆-close to a pair of mixed
strategies each with support of size O((∆/ǫ)2 log(1 + ∆−1) log n).
So far in Theorem 2 and Corollary 1 we have considered ǫ and ∆ fixed. It is also interesting to consider
games where the stability conditions hold uniformly for all ǫ small enough. We call such games uniformly
stable games. Formally:
Definition 8 Consider t ≥ 1. We say that a game is t-uniformly stable to perturbations (or t-uniformly well
supported approximation stable) if there exists ǫ0 = 1/poly(n) such that for all ǫ ≤ ǫ0, G satisfies (ǫ, tǫ)
stability to perturbations (or the well supported (ǫ, tǫ) approximation stability).
For games satisfying the t-uniform stability to perturbations condition with t = O(poly(log(n))) we can
find 1/poly(n)-approximate equilibria in npoly(log(n)) time, and more generally ǫ-approximate equilibria
in nlog (1/ǫ)poly(log(n)) time, thus achieving a FQPTAS. This provide a dramatic improvement over the best
worst-case bounds known.
Corollary 2 (1) Let t = O(poly(log(n))). There is a FQPTAS to find approximate-equilibria in games
satisfying the t-uniform well supported approximation stability condition (or the t-uniform stability to per-
turbations condition) with at most nO(t2) Nash equilibria.
(2) Games satisfying the t-uniform well supported approximation stability condition (or the t-uniform sta-
bility to perturbations condition) with at most nO(t2) Nash equilibria have the property that for any ∆ each
equilibrium is 8∆-close to a pair of mixed strategies each with support of size O(t2 log(1 + ∆−1) log n);
moreover, for any L∞-perturbation of magnitude ∆/t of such games, it must be the case that any Nash equi-
librium in G′ is 9∆-close to a pair of mixed strategies each with support of size O(t2 log(1 + ∆−1) log n).
Corollary 2 is especially interesting because the results of [8] prove that it is PPAD-hard to find 1/poly(n)-
approximate equilibria in general bimatrix games. Our results shows that under the (widely believed) as-
sumption that PPAD is not contained in quasi-polynomial time [9], such uniformly stable game are inher-
ently easier for computation of approximate equilibria than general bimatrix games. Moreover, variants of
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many games appearing commonly in experimental economics including the public goods game and identical
interest game [14] satisfy this condition.
5 Converting the general case to the stable case
In this section we show that computing a ǫ-equilibrium in a game satisfying the strong (ǫ,Θ(ǫ1/4)) approx-
imation stability is as hard as computing an Θ(ǫ1/4)-equilibrium in a general game. For our reduction, we
show that any general game can be embedded into one having the strong (ǫ,Θ(ǫ1/4)) approximation stabil-
ity property such that an ǫ equilibrium in the new game yields an Θ(ǫ1/4) in the original game. Since both
notions of (strong) stability to perturbations and (strong) well supported approximation stability generalize
the strong approximation stability condition, the main lower bound in this section (Theorem 4) applies to
these notions as well.
We start by stating a useful lemma that shows the existence of a family of modified matching pennies games
that are strong approximation stable games with certain properties that will be helpful in proving our main
lower bound.
Lemma 2 Assume that ∆ ≤ 1/10. Consider the games defined by the matrices:
R =


1 + α1,1 1 + α1,2 . . . 1 + α1,n 0
1 + α2,1 1 + α2,2 . . . 1 + α2,n 0
. . . . . .
1 + αn,1 1 + αn,2 . . . 1 + αn,n 0
0 0 . . . 0 2∆

 , C =


γ1,1 γ1,2 . . . γ1,n 1
γ2,1 γ2,2 . . . γ2,n 1
. . . . . .
γn,1 γn,2 . . . γn,n 1
2∆ 2∆ . . . 2∆ 0


where αi,j ∈ [−∆, 0] and γi,j ∈ [0,∆] for all i, j. Each such game satisfies the strong (∆2, 4∆) approxi-
mation stability condition. Moreover if (p, q) is a ∆2-Nash equilibrium, then we must have
∆/2 ≤ p1 + ...+ pn ≤ 4∆ and ∆/2 ≤ q1 + ...+ qn ≤ 4∆.
See Appendix B for a proof. We now present the main result of this section.
Theorem 4 Computing an ǫ-equilibrium in a game satisfying the strong (ǫ, 8ǫ1/4) approximation stability
condition is as hard as computing an (8ǫ)1/4-equilibrium in a general game.
Proof: The main idea is to construct a linear embedding of any given game into a larger game with one more
strategy per player played with large probability, thereby compressing the incentives of the original game
into a smaller scale. In particular, consider ∆ = (8ǫ)1/4 and consider a general game with payoff matrices
R and C . Let us construct a new game with the payoff matrix for the row player R′ defined as:
[
1n,n − (∆/2)1n,n + (∆/2)R 0n,1
01,n 2∆
]
and for the column player C ′ defined as:
[
(∆/2)1n,n + (∆/2)C 1n,1
2∆11,n 0
]
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(For s, r > 0, the matrix 1s,r is the s×r matrix with all entries set to 1 and the matrix 0s,r is the s×r matrix
with all entries set to 0.) By Lemma 2, the new game defined by R′ and C ′ satisfies the strong (∆2, 4∆)
approximation stability condition, which in turn implies satisfying (ǫ, 8ǫ1/4) approximation stability (since
ǫ ≤ ∆2 and 4(8)1/4 ≤ 8). We show next that any ∆4/8-equilibrium in this new game (defined by R′ and
C ′) induces a ∆-equilibrium in the original game (defined by R and C). Since ∆ = (8ǫ)1/4, this implies
the desired result.
Let (p, q) be an ∆4/8-equilibrium in the new game. By Lemma 2 (since ∆4/8 ≤ ∆2), p must have β∆
probability mass in the first n rows and q must have α∆ probability mass in the first n columns, where
α, β ∈ [1/2, 4]. Let pf , qf denote p restricted to the first n rows and q restricted to the first n columns.
Let p˜f = pf/|pf | and q˜f = qf/|qf |, where |pf | = β∆ and |qf | = α∆. We show that that (p˜f , q˜f ) is a
∆-equilibrium in the original game defined by R and C . We prove this by contradiction. Assume this is not
the case. Assume first that the row player has an ∆ incentive to deviate. There must exist ei such that:
eTi Rq˜f > p˜fRq˜f +∆.
Multiplying both sides by αβ∆3/2 and using the fact that αβ ≥ 1/4 we get:
β∆eTi (∆/2)Rqf > pf (∆/2)Rqf +∆
4/8. (2)
We clearly have β∆eTi (1n,n − (∆/2)1n,n)qf = pTf (1n,n − (∆/2)1n,n)qf , and by adding this quantity as
well as pn+1(2∆)qn+1 to both sides of inequality 2 we get:
β∆eTi (1n,n − (∆/2)1n,n + (∆/2)R)qf + pn+1(2∆)qn+1 >
pf (1n,n − (∆/2)1n,n + (∆/2)R)qf + pn+1(2∆)qn+1 +∆4/8.
which implies:
(β∆ei + pn+1en+1)
TR′q > pTR′q +∆4/8.
Therefore there exists a deviation for the row player (namely moving all β∆ probability mass from rows
1, 2, . . . , n onto row i), yielding a benefit of ∆4/8 to the row player. This contradicts the assumption that
(p, q) is an ∆4/8-equilibrium in the new game, as desired.
Assume now that the column player has an ∆ incentive to deviate. There must exist ej such that:
p˜Tf Cej > p˜
T
f Cq˜f +∆.
Multiplying both sides by αβ∆3/2 and using the fact that αβ ≥ 1/4 we get:
pTf (∆/2)C(α∆ej) > p
T
f (∆/2)Cqf +∆
4/8.
We have pTf (∆/2)1n,nα∆ej = pTf (∆/2)1n,nqf , so:
pTf ((∆/2)C + (∆/2)1n,n)α∆ej > p
T
f ((∆/2)C + (∆/2)1n,n)qf +∆
4/8. (3)
We also have pn+1(2∆, . . . , 2∆)α∆ej = pn+1(2∆, . . . , 2∆)qf . By adding this quantity as well as the term
pf (1, . . . , 1)qn+1 to the both sides of the inequality 3 inequality we get:
pTC ′(α∆ej + qn+1en+1) > p
TC ′q +∆4/8.
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Therefore there exists a deviation for the column player (namely moving all α∆ probability mass from
columns 1, 2, . . . , n onto column i), yielding a benefit of ∆4/8 to the column player. This contradicts the
assumption that (p, q) is an ∆4/8-equilibrium in the new game, as desired.
Theorem 4 implies that for any ǫ ≤ (1/8)(0.3393)4 , an algorithm for finding an ǫ-equilibria in a game
satisfying the strong (ǫ, 8ǫ1/4) approximation stability condition would imply a better than currently known
algorithm for finding approximate equilibria in general games (with an approximation factor of 0.3393).
6 Stability in constant-sum games
Consider a game defined by R and C . Let
P∗ = {p,∃ q s.t. (p, q) is a Nash equilibrium}
and
Q∗ = {q,∃ p s.t. (p, q) is a Nash equilibrium}.
We say that p is ∆-far from P∗ if the minimum distance between p and p′ ∈ P∗ is > ∆. Let vR and vC be
the unique values of the row and column player respectively in a Nash equilibrium [22]. Lemmas 3 and 4
below characterize constant sum games satisfying approximation stability terms of properties of the space
of mixed strategies for the row player and column player separately. Theorem 5 gives a polynomial time
algorithm for determining the approximately best parameters for the strong approximation stability property
for a given game.
Lemma 3 If for any p that is ∆-far from P∗ there exists ej such that pTRej < vR−α and for any q that is
∆-far fromQ∗ there exists ej such that eTj Cq < vC−α, then the game satisfies the (α/2,∆) approximation
stability.
Proof: We show that any (p, q) that is ∆-far from all Nash equilibria cannot be an α/2-equilibrium. Con-
sider (p, q) that is ∆-far from all Nash equilibria. Then either p is ∆-far from P∗ or q is ∆-far from
Q∗.11 Assume WLOG that p is ∆-far from p∗. We know that there exists ej such that pTRej < vR − α.
We show that (p, q) cannot be an α/2 Nash equilibrium. If pTRq < vR − α/2, then this is not an α/2-
equilibrium since the row player could play its minimax optimal strategy and get vR. On the other hand if
pTRq ≥ vR − α/2, then pTCq ≤ vC + α/2, but we know that pTCej > vC + α, so the column player
would have an α/2 incentive to deviate, as desired.
Lemma 4 If there exists p that is ∆-far from P∗ such that minj pTRej ≥ vR − α or if there exists q
that is is ∆-far from Q∗ such that minj eTj Cq ≥ vC − α, then the game cannot be (α,∆) approximation
stable. Moreover, if, in the former case, supp(p) ⊆ supp(p∗) for some p∗ ∈ P∗, or if, in the latter case,
supp(q) ⊆ supp(q∗) for some q∗ ∈ Q∗, then the game cannot be well-supported (α,∆) approximation
stable.
11This follows from the well known interchangeability property of constant-sum games, meaning that given two Nash equilibria
points (p1, q1) and (p2, q2), the strategy pairs (p1, q2) and (p2, q1) are also Nash equilibria. To see that note that if both p and q are
close to P∗ and Q∗ respectively, then there exists a Nash equilibria (p1, q1), (p2, q2) such that d(p, p1) ≤ ∆ and d(q, q1) ≤ ∆.
By interchangeability, we get that (p1, q2) is a Nash equilibrium and we also have d((p1, q2), (p, q)) ≤ ∆.
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Proof: Assume that there exists p that is ∆-far from P∗ such that minj pTRej ≥ vR − α. Let p∗ ∈ P∗ be
such that supp(p) ⊆ supp(p∗) if such p∗ exists, else let p∗ ∈ P∗ be arbitrary; let (p∗, q∗) be an equilibrium
that certifies that p∗ that is in P∗. We know that p∗TRq∗ = vR and p∗TCq∗ = vC . Clearly, (p, q∗) that
is ∆-far from (p∗, q∗). We show that (p, q∗) is an α-Nash equilibrium, i.e., neither player has more than
an α-incentive to deviate. We have pTRq∗ ≥ vR − α and p′TRq∗ ≤ vR for any p′ (since q∗ is minimax
optimal) so the row player has at most α-incentive to deviate. We also have pTCq∗ ≥ vC (since q∗ is
minimax optimal) and the most the column player could get is vC + α since minj pTRej ≥ vR − α, so
maxj p
TCej ≤ vC + α.
If the game satisfies the strong approximation stability condition, then we can efficiently compute good
approximations for the stability parameters. Specifically:
Theorem 5 Given any 0 < α < 1, we can use Algorithm 1 to whp determine ∆ such that the game satisfies
the (α/2, 2∆) strong approximation stability property, but not (α,∆/2) strong approximation stability. The
running time is polynomial nO(1/α2).
Proof: We first find a minimax optimal solution (p∗, q∗) and then in Step 2, a small support α-Nash (p′, q′).
In Step 3 we find ∆ such that all α/2-Nash equilibria are within distance ∆ of (p′, q′) and there exists
an α-Nash equilibrium at distance ∆ from (p′, q′). From the perspective of the row player, as shown in
Lemma 3, if there exists ej such that pTRej < vR − α, then (p, q) cannot be an α/2 Nash equilibrium
for any q, so all α/2 Nash equilibria must satisfy pTRej ≥ vR − α for all j. As shown in Lemma 4, for
any p such that pTRej ≥ vR − α, for all j we have that (p, q∗) is an α Nash equilibrium. Similarly for
the column player. So all α/2-equilibria must be at distance at most ∆ from (p′, q′), where ∆ is the output
of Algorithm 1, and there exists an α-Nash equilibrium that is at distance at ∆ from (p′, q′) . By triangle
inequality, we obtain that the game is (α/2, 2∆) stable and it is not (α,∆/2) stable. Note that the running
time is polynomial since we we perform steps (A), (B) at most nO(1/α2) times, so overall the running time
is polynomial nO(1/α2).
In order to determine the approximate parameters for the strong well supported approximation stability
property for a given game, we can adapt Algorithm 1 as follows. Given any 0 < α < 1, we can use
Algorithm 1 to whp determine ∆h. We then we re-run Algorithm 1, but in the LP in (A) we add the
constraint that pi = 0 for all i /∈ supp(p∗) (and similarly for q in the LP (B)) to get a value ∆l. Then by
lemmas 3 and 4, we are guaranteed that the game satisfies the (α/2, 2∆h), but not the (α,∆l/2) strong well
supported approximation stability property.
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A Standard Facts
We start by stating the McDiarmid inequality (see [13]) we use in our proofs:
Theorem 6 Let Y1, ..., Yn be independent random variables taking values in some set A, and assume that
t : An → R satisfies:
sup
y1,...,yn∈A,yi∈A
|t(y1, ..., yn)− t(y1, ..., yi−1, yi, yi+1, yn)| ≤ ci,
for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Then for all γ > 0 we have:
Pr {|t(Y1, ..., Yn)−E[t(Y1, ..., Yn)]| ≥ γ} ≤ 2e
−2γ2/
n∑
i=1
c2
i
We now state a well known fact showing any pair of strategies that is sufficiently close to a Nash equilibrium
is a sufficiently good approximate Nash equilibrium.
Claim 1 If (p, q) is α-close to a Nash equilibrium (p∗, q∗) (i.e., if d((p, q), (p∗, q∗)) ≤ α), then (p, q) is a
3α-Nash equilibrium.
B Additional Proofs
Lemma 2 Assume that ∆ ≤ 1/10. Consider the games defined by the matrices:
R =


1 + α1,1 1 + α1,2 . . . 1 + α1,n 0
1 + α2,1 1 + α2,2 . . . 1 + α2,n 0
. . . . . .
1 + αn,1 1 + αn,2 . . . 1 + αn,n 0
0 0 . . . 0 2∆

 , C =


γ1,1 γ1,2 . . . γ1,n 1
γ2,1 γ2,2 . . . γ2,n 1
. . . . . .
γn,1 γn,2 . . . γn,n 1
2∆ 2∆ . . . 2∆ 0


where αi,j ∈ [−∆, 0] and γi,j ∈ [0,∆] for all i, j. This game satisfies the strong (∆2, 4∆) approximation
stability condition. Moreover if (p, q) is a ∆2-Nash equilibrium, then we must have
∆/2 ≤ p1 + ...+ pn ≤ 4∆ and ∆/2 ≤ q1 + ...+ qn ≤ 4∆.
Proof: First note that eTn+1Rq = 2∆qn+1 and
eTi Rq = (1 + αi,1)q1 + (1 + αi,2)q2 + . . . + (1 + αi,n)qn for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
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Also pTCen+1 = p1 + . . .+ pn and
pTCej = p1γ1,j + . . . + pnγn,j + 2∆pn+1 for 1 ≤ j ≤ n.
By a simple case analysis, one can show that any Nash equilibrium (p, q) must have 0 < pn+1 < 1 and
0 < qn+1 < 1. (This is also implicit in our analysis on ∆2-Nash equilibria below). This then implies that in
any Nash equilibrium (p, q) such that pi 6= 0 we must have:
2∆qn+1 = (1 + αi,1)q1 + (1 + αi,2)q2 + . . .+ (1 + αi,n)qn. (4)
Similarly, in any Nash equilibrium (p, q) such that qj 6= 0 we must have:
p1 + . . . pn = p1γ1,j + . . . pnγn,j + 2∆pn+1. (5)
Identities 4 and 5 together with the fact that αi,j ∈ [−∆, 0] and γi,j ∈ [0,∆] for all i, j, imply that there
must exist a Nash equilibrium (p, q) satisfying:
2∆
1 + 2∆
≤ p1 + ...+ pn ≤ 2∆
1 +∆
and
2∆
1 + 2∆
≤ q1 + ...+ qn ≤ 2∆
1 +∆
. (6)
To get the desired stability guarantee we now show that any ∆2-equilibrium must have ∆/2 ≤ p1+...+pn ≤
4∆ and ∆/2 ≤ q1+ ...+qn ≤ 4∆. (This in turn implies that any ∆2-equilibrium must be at distance at most
4∆ from a Nash equilibrium satisfying relation (6).) We prove this by contradiction. Consider an arbitrary
∆2-equilibrium (p, q). We analyze a few cases.
Case 1: Suppose pn+1 > 1 − ∆/2. Then the column player’s payoff for column n + 1 is pTCen+1 =∑n
i=1 pi ≤ ∆/2. But the column player’s payoff for a column j ∈ {1, ..., n} is:
pTCej =
n∑
i=1
γi,jpi + 2∆pn+1 ≥ 2∆(1−∆/2).
If qn+1 > 1/2 then the column player has incentive to deviate at least:
pTCej − pTCq ≥ (1/2)[2∆(1 −∆/2)−∆/2] > ∆/2 > ∆2,
which cannot happen since (p, q) is a ∆2-equilibrium. On the other hand if qn+1 ≤ 1/2, then the row player
has huge incentive to deviate. Specifically, the row’s player payoff for row 1 is eT1 Rq ≥ (1/2)(1 − ∆),
but row’s player payoff for row n + 1 is eTn+1Rq ≤ (1/2)2∆ = ∆. Thus in this case the row player has
incentive to deviate at least:
eT1Rq − pTRq ≥ (1−∆/2)[1/2(1 −∆)−∆] > ∆,
which cannot happen since (p, q) is a ∆2-equilibrium.
Case 2: Suppose pn+1 < 1 − 4∆. Then the column player’s payoff for column n + 1 is pTCen+1 =∑n
i=1 pi ≥ 4∆, whereas the column player’s payoff for a column j ∈ {1, ..., n} is:
pTCej = p1γ1,j + . . . pnγn,j + 2∆pn+1 ≤ ∆
n∑
i=1
pi + 2∆pn+1 = ∆(1− pn+1) + 2∆pn+1 ≤ 2∆.
20
So, if qn+1 < 1−∆/2, then the column player has incentive to deviate at least:
pTCen+1 − pTCq ≥ (∆/2)[4∆ − 2∆] ≥ ∆2,
contradiction. On the other hand, if qn+1 > 1 − ∆/2, then the row player’s payoff for row n + 1 is
eTn+1Rq ≥ 2∆(1−∆/2), but the row player’s payoff for a rows i ∈ {1, ..., n} is:
eTi Rq =
n∑
j=1
(1 + αi,j)qj ≤ 1− qn+1 ≤ ∆/2.
So, in this case, the row player has incentive to deviate at least:
eTn+1Rq − pTRq ≥ 4∆[2∆(1−∆/2) −∆/2] > ∆2,
which cannot happen since (p, q) is a ∆2-equilibrium.
Case 3: Suppose qn+1 > 1−∆/2. As in the bottom-half of the case 2 analysis we have that the row player’s
payoff for row n+ 1 is eTn+1Rq ≥ 2∆(1−∆/2), but the row player’s payoffs for rows 1, ..., n are ≤ ∆/2.
So, if pn+1 < 1−∆ then the row player has incentive to deviate at least:
eTn+1Rq − pTRq ≥ ∆[2∆(1 −∆/2)−∆/2] > ∆2,
which cannot happen since (p, q) is a ∆2-equilibrium. On the other hand, if pn+1 ≥ 1−∆, then the column
player’s payoff for column n+1 is pTCen+1 =
∑n
i=1 pi ≤ ∆, but the column player’s payoff for a columns
j ∈ {1, ..., n} is:
pTCej = p1γ1,j + . . . pnγn,j + 2∆pn+1 ≥ (1−∆)(2∆).
So, the column player has incentive to deviate at least:
pTCej − pTCq ≥ qn+1[2∆(1 −∆)−∆] ≥ ∆/2 > ∆2,
which cannot happen since (p, q) is a ∆2-equilibrium.
Case 4: Finally assume that qn+1 < 1 − 4∆. Then the row player’s payoff for row n+1 is eTn+1Rq ≤
2∆(1 − 4∆), but row player’s payoffs for rows 1, ..., n are ≥ (4∆)(1 −∆). So, if pn+1 > 1/2 then Row
has incentive to deviate at least:
eTn+1Rq − pTRq ≥ (1/2)[4∆(1 −∆)− 2∆(1 − 4∆)] ≥ ∆/2 > ∆2,
which cannot happen since (p, q) is a ∆2-equilibrium. Finally if pn+1 < 1/2 < 1 − 4∆ we apply the
analysis in case 2.
Thus any ∆2-equilibrium must have ∆/2 ≤ p1+ ...+ pn ≤ 4∆ and ∆/2 ≤ q1+ ...+ qn ≤ 4∆, as desired.
This concludes the proof.
Lemma 5 Assume that the game G satisfies the (ǫ,∆)-approximation stability and that the union of all
∆-balls around all Nash equilibria do not cover the whole space. Then we must have 3∆ ≥ ǫ.
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Proof: Since the union of all ∆-balls around all Nash equilibria do not cover the whole space, we must have
a (p, q) that is at distance exactly ∆ from some fixed Nash equilibrium and that is ∆-far from all the other
Nash equilibria. By Claim 1 we also have that this is a 3∆ Nash equilibrium. This then implies the desired
result.
Lemma 6 Assume that the bimatrix game G specified by R and C has a non-pure Nash equilibrium.
(a) If G satisfies the strong well supported (ǫ,∆)-approximation stability condition, then we must have
∆ ≥ ǫ/4.
(b) If G satisfies the strong (ǫ,∆)-stability to perturbations condition, then we must have ∆ ≥ ǫ/8.
Proof: Assume G satisfies the strong well supported (ǫ,∆)-approximation stability condition. By definition,
there exists a Nash equilibrium (p∗, q∗) such that any well supported ǫ-equilibrium is ∆-close to (p∗, q∗).
Let (p, q) be an arbitrary non-pure Nash equilibrium of G and assume WLOG that p is a mixed strategy.
Consider an α internal deviation of the row player, i.e., consider p′ with supp(p′) ⊆ supp(p) such that
d(p, p′) = α . Since supp(p′) ⊆ supp(p) we have p′TRq = pTRq. Since (p, q) is a Nash equilibrium we
have pTCej = pTCq ≡ vC for all j ∈ supp(q) and pTCej ≤ vC for all j /∈ supp(q). Since d(p, p′) = α
we have
|p′TCej − pTCej| ≤ |(p′ − p)TCej | ≤ α,
for all j, so p′TCej ≥ vC − α, for all j ∈ supp(q) and p′TCej ≤ vC + α, for all j /∈ supp(q). Thus
(p′, q) is a well supported 2α-Nash equilibrium. By construction, we have d((p′, q), (p, q)) = α. Since d
is a metric, by the triangle inequality, we get that at least one of the pairs (p′, q) and (p, q) is at least α/2
far from (p∗, q∗); however they are both 2α well supported Nash equilibria. This implies that we must have
∆ ≥ ǫ/4, as desired. By Theorem 1, we immediately get (b) as well.
C Examples
To illustrate our notions of stability, we present two n by n games satisfying uniform stability to perturba-
tions.
Example 1 A classic game from experimental economics is the public goods game which is defined is as
follows. We have two players and each can choose to play a number between 0 and n− 1 corresponding to
an amount of money to contribute. If the Row player contributes i dollars and the Column player contributes
j dollars, then each gets back 0.75(i+ j). So the payoff to the Row player is 0.75(i+ j)− i and the payoff
to the Column player is 0.75(i + j) − j, where i ∈ {0, 1, ..., n − 1} and j ∈ {0, 1, ..., n − 1}. This has
payoffs ranging from 0 up to 0.75(n − 1), so to scale to the range [0, 1] as we do in our paper, we multiply
all the payoffs by 1/n. I.e., if the Row player plays i and the Column player plays j then the payoff to the
Row player is [0.75j − 0.25i]/n and the payoff to the Column player is [0.75i − 0.25j]/n.
First note that this game is (ǫ, 0) stable to perturbations for all ǫ < 1/(8n). To see this note that without any
perturbation, for any j and any i ≥ 1 we have eT0Rej − eTi Rej = 0.25i/n ≥ 0.25/n. That means that the
Row player prefers playing action 0 compared to action i by 0.25i/n ≥ 0.25/n. So, in a game R′, C ′ that
is an L∞ ǫ-perturbation of of our game we get: eT0R′ej − eTi R′ej ≥ 0.25/n − 2ǫ > 0. That means that in
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the perturbed game, the Row player still prefers playing action 0. This implies that the only equilibrium in
the perturbed game has the Row player playing action 0, and similarly the Column player playing 0, so the
only equilibrium is (0, 0).
We now claim that this game is not (ǫ, 0.99) stable for any ǫ > 1/(4n). To see this consider adding ǫ to
R[1, 0]. I.e., if the Row player plays action 1 and the Column player plays action 0, then the payoff to Row
player is −0.25/n+ ǫ > 0. Now, (1, 0) is a Nash equilibrium since this payoff is strictly greater than R[i, 0]
for any i 6= 1. In particular, R[0, 0] = 0 and R[i, 0] < 0 for all i ≥ 2. So, there is now a Nash equilibrium
(actually the unique Nash equilibium) at variation distance 1 from the original Nash equilibrium.
Example 2 We present here a variant of the identical interest game. Both players have n available actions.
The first action is to stay home, and the other actions correspond to n−1 different possible meeting locations.
If a player chooses action 1 (stay home), his payoff is 1/2 no matter what the other player is doing. If the
player chooses to go out to a meeting location, his payoff is 1 if the other player is there as well and it is 0
otherwise. Formally, R[1, j] = 1/2 for all j, R[i, i] = 1 for all i > 1 R[i, j] = 0 for i > 1, j 6= i. and
similarly C[i, 1] = 1/2, C[j, j] = 1 for j > 1, C[i, j] = 0 for j > 1, i 6= j. We claim that this game is well
supported (ǫ, 2ǫ)-stable for all ǫ < 1/6, so it is 2-uniformly stable.
Note that eT1Rq = 1/2 and eTi Rq = qi for i > 1. Similarly, pTCe1 = 1/2 and pTCei = pi for i > 1.
Note that if (p, q) is an well supported ǫ-Nash equilibrium and if qi < 1/2 − ǫ for i > 1 then both pi = 0
and qi = 0. This follows immediately since eT1Rq = 1/2 and eTi Rq = qi for i > 1, so pi must equal 0
on any action whose expected payoff is < 1/2 − ǫ. Since pi = 0, qi must equal 0 as well in order to be
well-supported. Also note that if (p, q) is an well supported ǫ-Nash equilibrium and if qi > 1/2+ǫ for i > 0
then both pi = 1 and qi = 1. If qi > 1/2 + ǫ we have eTi Rq = 1/2 + ǫ and since eTj Rq ≤ 1/2 for j 6= i we
must have pi = 1. This in turn implies qi = 1.
Similarly, we can show the same for the row player as well. These imply that the well supported ǫ-Nash
equilibria that are not already Nash equilibria must satisfy: for any action i > 1, i ∈ supp(q), we have
1/2 − ǫ ≤ qi ≤ 1/2 + ǫ and 1/2 − ǫ ≤ pi ≤ 1/2 + ǫ. Similarly, for any action i > 1, i ∈ supp(p), we
have 1/2 − ǫ ≤ qi ≤ 1/2 + ǫ and 1/2 − ǫ ≤ pi ≤ 1/2 + ǫ. We have two cases. The first one is if there is
exactly one action i > 1 in supp(q). In that case, (p, q) has distance at most ǫ from the Nash equilibrium
(1/2e0+1/2ei, 1/2e0 +1/2ei). The second one is if there are two such actions i, j > 0 in supp(q). In that
case, (p, q) has distance at most 2ǫ from the Nash equilibrium (1/2ei + 1/2ej , 1/2ei + 1/2ej), as desired.
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Algorithm 1 Determining the strong stability parameters of a constant sum game.
Input: R, C , parameter α.
1. Solve for minimax optimal (p∗, q∗).
2. Step 2: Apply the sampling procedure in [18] from (p∗, q∗) to get (p′, q′) with support of size
O((log n)/α2) that is an α-Nash. Set ∆ = 0.
3. Find ∆ as follows:
(A) For each partition of the support of p′ into supp+ and supp− do:
i. Solve the following LP:
max∆ =
∑
i∈supp+
(pi − p′i) +
∑
i∈supp−
(p′i − pi) +
∑
i∈{1,2,...,n}\supp(p′)
pi
s.t. pi ≥ p′i for all i ∈ supp+
pi ≤ p′i for all i ∈ supp−
pTRej ≥ vR − α for all j
ii. If ∆ is smaller than v, the value of the previous LP, reset ∆ to be v.
(B) for each partition of the support of q′ into supp+ and supp− do:
i. Solve the following LP:
max∆ =
∑
i∈supp+
(qi − q′i) +
∑
i∈supp−
(q′i − qi) +
∑
i∈{1,2,...,n}\supp(q′)
qi
s.t. qi ≥ q′i for all i ∈ supp+
qi ≤ q′i for all i ∈ supp−
eTj Cq ≥ vC − α for all j
ii. If ∆ is smaller than v, the value of the previous LP, reset ∆ to be v.
Output: Radius ∆.
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